Cannibal Democracies, Theocratic Secularism: The Turkish Version

YUKSEL.ORG

This paper was the topic of an interdisciplinary symposium held in March 1999 at Yeshiva University, Cardozo Law School , New York. The symposium was moderated by David Golove, Professor of Law, Cardozo Law School. Panelists Thomas Christiano, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona and Gregory Fox, Professor of Law at Yale Law School, focused on the philosophical paradox involving the banning political parties to protect democracies; William Pfaff, International Affairs Columnist at International Herald Tribune and Paul Magnarella, Professor of Law and Anthropology at the University of Florida focused on the democratic process and human rights violations in Turkey. (For the commentaries at the symposium, please click here).

CANNIBAL DEMOCRACIES, THEOCRATIC SECULARISM:

THE TURKISH VERSION

7 Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, 423 (1999)

I. INTRODUCTION

TŸrkiye (FN1) boasts to be the only Muslim country that is ruled by democracy (FN2). However, the Turkish version of democracy differs greatly from traditional Western notions of democracy and is also further distinguished by its unique and even odd practice of secularism. During the last half-century, the Turkish Constitutional Court (FN3) and the military regimes have banned more than thirty political parties. While there is no sign that their appetite to ban political parties has been quelled, such repressive political actions have become routine practice in "protecting the Turkish democracy." Indeed, any argument that such actions are justified to protect the "Turkish democracy" is oxymoronic at best, and has lost credibility with the recent ruling by the Turkish Constitutional Court allowing the abolishment of Turkey's largest political party, the Refah or Welfare Party (FN4).

In a lengthy draft opinion to the Turkish Constitutional Court, Vural Savas, the Attorney General of the Turkish Republic, attacked the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) and its members on ideological grounds (FN5). Surprisingly, Savas, as a top official of the so-called "secular" republic, harshly criticized, blamed and condemned the sacred book of Islam and the religion of ninety-eight percent of the country. Months after the publication of his aggressive opinion, the Turkish Constitutional Court abolished the Welfare Party for trying to establish a theocratic system in Turkey.

This paper will address the opinion of the Attorney General, as it reflects the ideology of the Turkish elite, and will evaluate the decision of the Constitutional Court, reported on February 22, 1998 in the T.C. Resmi Gazete (FN6). This paper will conclude with suggestions and remedies. The procedural details involved with the workings of the Turkish Constitution are beyond the scope of this paper (FN7).

Attorney General Vural Savas' opinion suffers five primary flaws:

1. Abolishment of the Welfare Party demonstrates that the oligarchy (consisting of major media, businessmen, and military leaders) uses "democracy" only if and when it serves its interests.

2. Abolishment of the Welfare Party increases the risk of hurling Turkey into an Algerian-like civil war. With the Welfare Party no longer intact, opportunities for the dissemination of propaganda from underground organizations and religious orders striving to establish "sharia" (sectarian jurisprudence) by means of force will be created. Turkey cannot endure the possible civil strife this may bring, especially with the already volatile situations existing in regions heavily populated by the Kurdish minorities who oppose the racist and militarist policies of the Turkish government. Neither the Turkish economy nor its military can survive such a widespread conflict on two fronts.

3. The Constitution is procedurally illegitimate and infected with substantial contradictions. It was imposed upon the people through a non-democratic process, and by non-elected generals. It contains articles that contradict the principles of "modern democracy," even though the Turkish judiciary, its legislators, and the members of the military coup often refer to the notion of "modern democracy" when justifying their actions. The Constitution, infected by hero-worship and cults of personality, resembles the constitutions of communist and theocratic regimes. It contains dogmas and imposes unnecessary limits to personal and group liberty.

4. The Attorney General's actions contradict the principles of "secularism." Aggressive attacks on the Quran (FN8) by an official of a "secular" state who is paid by the taxes of its citizens is contrary to secularist ideals. Indeed, secularism is altogether different from atheism, and the actions of governments should follow non-religious legal authority rather than atheistic ideals.

5. The Attorney General's criticisms of the Quran are based on erroneous interpretations of its text (FN9).

II. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

In late 1982, the current Constitution of the Turkish Republic was put on the ballot (FN10). This was the third constitution for the young Republic in sixty years, and much like Turkey's constitutions of the past, it was drafted under the supervision of its military leaders (FN11). The Constitution, allegedly approved by a super-majority of voters, however falls far behind Ataturk's (FN12) dream of being a vehicle by which Turkey would catch up with "modern civilization." Some learned criticisms of Turkey's Constitution note that the document lacks political legitimacy and that it was made primarily to preserve the state, not to promote the welfare of its people.

Ersin Kalaycioglu, Professor of Political Science at Bogazici University, criticizes Turkey's last two constitutions, the Constitutions of 1961 and 1982, and asserts that they "were both designed without the full participation or cooperation of all the major political forces in the country. Thus, they contributed mainly to a crisis of political legitimacy." (FN13) Turkey's current Constitution, however, is more restrictive of individual and group rights than its predecessor (FN14).

Suna Kili, Professor of Political Science at Bogazici University, finds the Constitution of 1982 aimed "fundamentally at the preservation of the state." (FN15)

Professor Kili notes that "under Article Fifteen [of the Turkish Constitution], the declaration of a state of emergency is a reason for the suspension of rights and freedoms. . . . Thus, the Constitution of 1982 allows for the restriction and/or suspension of rights and freedoms by administrative acts." (FN16) Professor Kili also heavily criticizes a procedural provision in Article 153:

Given this provision, laws and freedoms may remain in force for up to one year after they have been ruled unconstitutional. Moreover, the Constitution of 1982 deprives the Constitutional Court of the power to review those decrees which carry the force of law issued by the cabinet during a state of emergency, martial law, or war. (FN17)

A. Theocratic Dogmas and Logical Fallacies in the Turkish Constitution (FN18)

Article 1 of the Turkish Constitution very simply and beautifully states that: "The Turkish State is a Republic." However, later squeezed among the beautiful words of the Constitution is the name 'Ataturk.' the founder general of the Turkish Republic. Ataturk, the charismatic leader who led a series of revolutions in the 1920s and 1930s that changed the direction of Turkey from a medieval theocratic monarchy to a modern secular republic, was so popular that he succeeded in changing the alphabet of the entire nation.

However, allusions to national heroes and founding fathers (no matter how popular they may be) in a country's constitution is a characteristic of a totalitarian and theocratic regimes. For instance, the names of Marx and Lenin can be found in Article III of Albania's pre-1991 constitution. In the preamble to China's constitution, one can find the name of Mao Tse Tung in addition to the names of Marx and Lenin within its text. In Saudi Arabia's constitution, the Saudi family is praised, and in the preamble to Iran's constitution, Khomeini is praised. Indeed, no developed country with an established democracy has the names of its founding fathers or heroes in the text of its constitution (FN19).

While official religions and dogmas created in the name of national heroes may not be sufficient to explain why those countries are not among democratically civilized nations, they do provide a clue in that regard. Turkey, by placing Ataturk's name in the Constitution, has created a sacred dogma in his name and has thereby made Ataturk's name a symbolic trademark of the Turkish militarist and racist oligarchy.

Article 4 poses a logical problem. The article lists the un-amendable articles but fails to include itself among the list. The required majority of the members of the Congress may change Article 4, however unlikely that may be. Indeed, publically voicing such an intention under Turkish law could lead to the denial of liberty and personal freedom under Article 27, "Freedom of Science and Art" of the Constitution. Under the Constitution, such actions would be justified by the following clause in the Constitution: The right to freedom of expression cannot be used to promote amendments to Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Constitution (FN20).

B. The Prohibited Language

Articles that supposedly grant the freedom of expression and protect the press against censorship, contain clauses justifying prohibition of speeches, periodicals or literature written in Kurdish (FN21). For example, Article 26 of the Turkish Constitution states: "No language prohibited by law shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought." (FN22) Article 28 states that "[p]ublication shall not be made in any language prohibited by law." (FN23)

While no other articles referring to "prohibited languages" in the constitutions of any other country come to mind, ironically, the expression "language prohibited by law" is mentioned under articles which are entitled with the word "freedom." The freedom of prohibiting the language of an oppressed minority, as it appears, is what the Turkish Constitution protects. (FN24)

Admittedly, all of the prosecutors do not share the same mentality. There are government attorneys who have digested the principles of democracy and are promoters of freedom and civil rights for individuals. Nevertheless, a single prosecutor is enough to issue an arrest warrant and drag an author to court. Similarly, despite many high ranking military officials who are against the military's intervention in domestic politics, a gang of top generals can flirt with politicians, give orders, and overthrow the government. Turkey has witnessed three military coups d'etat and several military warnings since its formation in 1923 (FN25).

C. Other Repressive Articles

Article 2 of the present Constitution exemplifies the official mentality of the totalitarian regime and Article 4 exhibits the poor judgment of its drafters. Surprisingly, the Constitution contains articles explaining the goals and duties of the state and the rights and freedoms of citizens. However, in the articles where the Constitution details the use of individual rights and freedoms, it takes back the granted rights in the articles or paragraphs that follow. The Constitution does not use impolite, rude, or unpolished language. The style of the Constitution does not resemble that of the neighborhood bully. Rather, the Constitution employs clever and adept linguistic techniques while restricting individual rights and freedoms, techniques that are well-known by copywriters of advertising agencies. It pours acid on the roots of rights and freedoms while it appears to be showering the citizens with numerous rights and freedoms. Article 13 illustrates how the rights and freedoms given by spoon can be taken away by ladle in a civilized manner (FN26). Articles 26, 27 and 28 define those ladles. Articles 33 and 34 under the guise of bestowing citizens with rights and freedoms, empower the state with arbitrary censorship and prohibition (FN27).

The states that turn their constitutions to prohibitions grow to be cannibal or vampire democracies. Political parties are sacrificed on the whims of the oligarchy. Many totalitarian and theocratic regimes use their constitutions to show off or to fool the international community, and they systematically violate human rights which they had agreed to observe. In states with working democracies, on the other hand, constitutions impose minimum limitations on the individual and group rights and freedoms; they aim to protect minorities from the tyranny of the majorities (FN28). While all constitutions reflect the ideal goal, the constitutions of democratic countries do not enforce taboos and dogmas attributed to their heroes or founding fathers; they provide protection for ideas that are unorthodox or perceived as infidel or unpatriotic. In this regard, the Turkish Constitution is far behind the constitutions of countries labeled as "Western." For example, if one were to compare the Turkish constitution to that of Switzerland or even of Mongolia and their practice of democracy, one will find that the Turkish one lacks the color and spice of true democracy (FN29).

III. THE MILITARY AS THE GUARDIAN OF THE TURKISH DEMOCRACY

After the coup in 1980, the generals who drafted the current Constitution inserted themselves into the daily politics of the country. They cited the Constitution as relevant authority (FN30) and began participating in weekly cabinet meetings, involving themselves in every decision they deemed related to the security of the secular, Kemalist Republic. (FN31)

Al literally "stinking" example of how the National Security Council protects the peace and security of the country has recently become a big issue in Turkey. During Muslim's biggest holiday, The Festival of Sacrifice, many families sacrifice farm animals such as sheep and cows. The skins of these animals are usually donated to religious non-profit organizations or mosques. However, until recently, Muslims had a choice between donating their skins to a religious organization or to the Turkish Air Foundation ("TAF"), a government organization. Despite official commercials and declarations promoting the TAF, and legally imposed restrictions on private donation collectors, the TAF was only able to obtain a fraction of the skins donated during the Festival. To rectify this situation, the Ministry of Justice, upon the advice of the National Security Council, issued an order asking prosecutors to punish any non-TAF organization or individual who collects or accepts the skins of sacrificed animals by placing such individual in prison for six months (FN32).

Additionally, the 'head-scarves' of women has long been another 'peace and security' issue with the military (FN33). The leading Turkish military generals have publicly declared their opposition to Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz and given him an ultimatum when he sided with a moderate view allowing university students to wear head-scarves (FN34). Generals publicly attacked and humiliated the previous two Prime Ministers, Necmeddin Erbakan, and his coalition partner, Tansu Ciller. They did not hesitate to voice their disapproval when Prime Minister Yilmaz gave a speech declaring that protection of democracy and the Republic is the job of Congress, not the military (FN35). The following day, top generals held a meeting and in a brief statement rebuffed the prime minister by reminding him of the military's constitutional duty to protect the country against domestic elements dangerous for peace and security. A prominent Turkish newspaper wrote:

The Generals [held] a meeting yesterday, after Yilmaz's speech in the Parliament as a warning to the military not to meddle in government affairs and gave a harsh answer. The generals stated, 'We don't need anybody to remind us our duties. Regardless of their political post nobody has a power to force the military to give up its fight against the Islamic fundamentalism for the sake of their political ambition or benefits' as a response to Yilmaz' warning. . . . Coalition partner DTP leader Husamettin Cindoruk said . . .:'I want to perceive the declaration as the loyalty of the military regime.' (FN36)

Prime Minister Yilmaz, who just the day before was a lion of democracy (FN37), characterized the military warning as a "democratic reminder." (FN38) This spectacle once again disappointed those who had the dream of a truly democratic Turkey (FN39).

While it is unlikely that all the generals involved in military coups or warnings have bad intentions, their possible good intentions are not sufficient by themselves to save Turkey from chaos, mismanagement and civil unrest.

Problematically, coup leaders are not held responsible for their bad actions. Rather, some of the leaders have been rewarded by the intimidated congressmen of the Republic and have been elected president (FN40). The generals who participate in coups often retire with prestige and receive lucrative pensions. After retirement they usually obtain prominent jobs on the boards of big banks or corporations. Additionally, the Chief-Prosecutor, one who is adamant about the banning of political parties in the name of democracy, does not show the courage or wisdom to charge or arrest those who abolished the Constitution, banned all political parties, violated human rights, and filled prisons with authors, intellectuals and political dissidents (FN41). Perhaps for the good of Turkey, Turkish attorneys should hold those generals responsible for their actions, and not pay attention to their good intentions. This would be a more productive use of their resources than attempting to ban a party that received more than twenty percent of the vote (FN42).

Journalist/columnist Mehmet Altan complained that the Attorney General's draft opinion scarred the legal system with its style, likening it to the biased and aggressive style of a rival politician. Mr. Altan reminded his readers of the double standard:

There are "colossal differences" between the practice of the modern world of the universal and the practice of Turkish judiciary. Therefore, we are always convicted by the European Human Rights Commission. For example, the Turkish legal system sentenced the major who forced villagers to eat shit to only ten months and released him on probation. The Turkish Supreme Court of Appeals confirmed the decision of the trial court. The European Human Rights Commission, later re-investigate the trial and penalized the Turkish government to compensate the citizens who were forced to eat shit by paying four billion Turkish lira (equivalent of approximately, fifty thousand dollar). We are reminded to take justice seriously and do not use double-standard. (FN43)

The responsibility of finding a solution to the problems of the crawling Turkish democracy should be left to people, civil organizations, politicians and scholars, not the military. Democracy cannot be restored by undemocratic or non-democratic institutions and authorities. Democracy cannot be reformed or improved by military minds. This is against the nature of things.

Democracy requires a price. Societies must freely pass through certain experiences to discover and appreciate democracy. Some of the experiences might be painful, but military intervention slows down and delays this process. Those who cannot tolerate a political party with religious concerns should take lessons from Algeria (FN44).

IV. DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

The Attorney General's assessment that the abolition of Articles 141, 142 and 163 of the Turkish Criminal Law was a misfortune accomplished by the coalition of communist and religious parties is flawed (FN45). It is incomprehensible that the Attorney General could talk about human rights, dignity and freedom while trying to reserve them exclusively for those who belong to the Kemalist elite.

The Attorney General defines democracy pretty well:

Democracy is not a system where only elections are held. It is a life-style that show itself in every aspect of life requiring free thought, arguments and investigation. In other words, democracy encourages individuals to actively participate in the political process through arguments, criticism, investigation and production of alternatives. This participation can be individual as well as in groups. (FN46)

It appears impossible for the Attorney General to be in favor of such a democracy while he defends the former repressive articles 141, 142 and 163 mandating imprisonment for those who question, criticize, argue and seek alternative solutions. One cannot preach about democracy, freedom and modern civilization while asserting that the truth and alternatives are in his backyard and if you look for the truth and alternatives outside you will be declared a traitor and beaten.

A. The Value of Freedom of Expression in the Western World

In the case of Texas v. Johnson (FN47), the U.S. Supreme Court extended the freedom of expression to the burning of the American flag. The Supreme Court defended its decision with the following argument:

The state position, therefore, amounts to a claim that an audience that takes serious offense at particular expression is necessarily likely to disturb the peace and that the expression may be prohibited on this basis. Our precedents do not countenance such a presumption. On the contrary, they recognize that a principal 'function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute.' . . . If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. (FN48)

Since Texas v. Johnson, there has not been an increase in the number of flag burning incidents in America. Rather, the controversy has since become moot. At the same time, financial resources of the American government are not spent to prosecute or imprison flag burners, and the energy of the police force has not been allocated to suppress them. Furthermore, the honor and the identity of the American flag was also rescued from being the subject of a naughty battle between the lawmakers and the militants determined to find loopholes, such as reducing or adding the number of stars and wearing flags on shorts.

Instead of buying arms from America, Turkey should take lessons from America's examples. If there were a working democracy and respect for human rights in Turkey, the country could dramatically reduce the size of its armed forces and imports of arms. It would also establish a better relationship with its democratic neighbor, Greece, and would not be waging war against its own citizens. In such an environment the anti-democratic forces would lose power.

The passionate proponent of freedom, philosopher John Stuart Mill, made the following remark:

The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of the opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error. (FN49)

Indeed, history is full of examples of universally accepted ideas which were first expressed by dissenting minorities.

B. International Law and Treaties

The Turkish Constitution incorporates international agreements into the domestic law. "International agreements duly put into effect carry the force of law. No appeal to the Constitutional Court can be made with regard to these agreements on the ground that they are unconstitutional." (FN50)

Turkey as a founding member of United Nations has an international obligation to abide by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (FN51). The articles protecting minorities, religious beliefs and political opinions have been violated frequently by the Turkish government. Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, Kurdish organizations, authors and parties questioning the militarist approach to the Kurdish problem have been under continuous assault and oppression, (FN52) as have religious organizations, parties and their members. Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the UDHR contain clear and comprehensive language regarding the religious, intellectual and political rights of individuals.

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. (FN53)

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. (FN54)

Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. No one may be compelled to belong to an association. (FN55)

Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. . . . (FN56)

Turkish governments, led by military leaders and the Constitutional Court, have frequently persecuted Turkish citizens for religious beliefs and practices that pose no harm to the principles of democracy and secularism. The Attorney General in his allegations quotes the decision of the Constitutional Court that struck down a statute permitting girls to wear head-scarves for religious reasons:

[C]lasses and related areas must be free of symbols of religious beliefs. Therefore, wearing head-scarves in the institutions of higher education for religious purposes cannot be reconciled with the secular scientific environment . . . . The issue of dress and attire is limited with the Turkish Revolution and Ataturk's principles and it is not a subject of freedom of conscience. (FN57)

The language of the Turkish Constitutional Court is deceptive because it implies that wearing head-scarves is allowed in institutions other than universities. However, the ban is not only imposed on government employees but also enforced on students - the real cause of controversy. Forcing students and citizens to give up their personal or religious choices regarding their dress code is evidence of a military mentality. The Turkish government now refuses to issue official papers to citizens who submit pictures with head-scarves. By imposing "uniforms," not only on government employees, but also on every citizen who comes in contact with government, the Attorney General and the Turkish Constitutional Court confuse secularism with their atheistic paranoia, and the laws of a nation with the rules of a military school. Creating a national crisis out of petty prohibitions has nothing to do with secularism and western civilization, the values to which the Turkish elite pretends to adhere.

The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Human Rights Convention, or EHRC), to which Turkey is a signatory (FN58), adopts many of the articles and provisions of the UDHR. For example, Article 9 of the EHRC repeats Article 18 of the Universal Declaration (FN59). The EHRC, like Article 29 of UDHR, acknowledges that those freedoms will be subject to "such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." (FN60)

The word "democracy" appears in both the Universal Declaration and the European Convention as a standard for the application of the articles of the treaties. This language is an implicit acknowledgment of the right to democratic governance. Furthermore, on March 20, 1952, European countries explicitly mentioned the electoral entitlement in the Article 3 of Protocol 1.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature. (FN61)

In fact, democratic governance is an emerging international right. The European Union members (not including Turkey), with the participation of Canada, the United States and Eastern Europe, have officially recognized such a right. Thomas M. Franck enthusiastically summarizes the new international trend regarding democracy:

At a meeting in Copenhagen in June 1990, they affirmed that 'democracy is an inherent element of the rule of law' and recognized 'the importance of pluralism with regard to political organizations. Among the 'inalienable rights of all human beings,' they decided, is the democratic entitlement. . . . participants also linked recognition of the democratic entitlement by governments to the validation of their right to govern. (FN62)

Turkey, with its history of military interventions and parties banning, is far from complying with the standards set by the European Convention. Of most concern, however, is the American-Turkish relationship. An editorial in New York Times noted this strange companionship:

Turkey's politically meddlesome generals seem determined to push their country into crisis by thwarting democratic solutions to its problems. . . . Turkey is a NATO ally and an important American military partner in the Middle East. Hence Washington maintains cordial ties with Turkish generals. But it should reject the generals' contention that their clumsy interventions in Turkey's political life defend the causes of secularism and democracy. In fact, the military's conduct undermines both.

The threat of Iran-style Islamic fundamentalism understandably worries secular Turks, especially women, and concerns Washington. But radicalizing an Islamic electoral movement and driving it underground will only lead its supporters to give up on the peaceful and democratic means they now believe in. (FN63)

Although it is not clear whether the editorial implicitly approves a non-clumsy military intervention, its primary reasoning appears sound. The United States, by supporting the militarist Turkish government, is 'betting on the wrong horse' both politically and morally. Human Rights Watch in its 1995 report demonstrates the inconsistency in U.S. foreign policy.

Despite documenting the fact that Turkey has misused U.S. weapons, the Clinton administration, which says it supplies Turkey with 80 percent of its foreign military hardware, has consistently refused to link arms sales to improvements in Turkey's human rights record. . . .

In fact, based on Human Rights Watch interviews with U.S. military personnel, it appears that Pentagon representatives in Ankara are more eager than ever to sell Turkey U.S. weapons, including M-60 tanks, helicopter gunships, cluster bombs, ground-to-ground missiles and small arms. The U.S. is also involved in co-production agreements with the Turkish defense industry, most notably helping to build the F-16 fighter-bomber, which the U.S. State Department acknowledged may have been used indiscriminately to kill Kurdish civilians, and a new armored personnel carrier. (FN64)

In the past, the United States supported Iran's oppressive king Shah Riza. Their actions backfired in the so-called Islamic revolution of 1979. Similarly, the U.S. supported Saddam Hussein against Iran. This also backfired in 1990 with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The American support for Saudi Arabia's oppressive regime, besides being morally wrong, incubates a social and political volcano in the region. The myopic American foreign policy with its multi-standard approach might serve the short-term interests of multinational corporations, but does not serve the long-term interests of the American people nor those of the people of the world.

V. THE PARADOX: SHOULD DEMOCRACIES ALLOW ANTI-DEMOCRATIC PARTIES TO GRAB POWER?

Should democracies allow a political party whose members contemplate ideas of getting rid of democracy to exist, or should democracies require the abolition of such a party? Issues concerning the priority of democracy over political tolerance, reconciliation of political party banning with principles of democracy, and the role of the military in such a regime are key to the debate.

Gregory H. Fox, Professor of Law at New York University and Georg Nolte of the Max Planck Institute, evaluated the cancellation of the Algerian election and abolition of the winning party, FIS, by the military by asking the question, "how can a democracy protect itself against its enemies and still remain democratic?" (FN65) The authors, after distinguishing two categories of democracies according to their form and content, concluded that the struggle of democracy for survival is more important than the short-term rights of anti-democratic elements. If it is true that the FIS party in Algeria declared that it would put an end to democracy after winning the elections, then by voting for FIS, the majority of the Algerian population chose to deprive themselves of democratic freedom. Using Hitler's rise to power through the democratic process as an example, the authors do not find the arguments raising worries about the abuse of this justification. (FN66) The authors list England, Botsawana and Japan as procedurally tolerant democracies, the U.S. as the militant substantive democracy, and France, Canada and India as tolerant substantive democracies. The authors find the substantive democracies more realistic:

In this view, democratic procedure is not an end in itself but a means of creating a society in which citizens enjoy certain essential rights, primary among them the right to vote for their leaders.

None of these rights, however, is absolute in the sense that it may be used to abolish the right itself or other basic rights. (FN67)

The authors argue that whenever the procedure shows diversion from the goal, the procedure should be sacrificed temporarily to save the goal. John Stuart Mill, in his book, On Liberty, appears to provide some support for the authors of "Intolerant Democracies." Mill believed that in a civilized country a person cannot be free to sell himself as a slave since giving up one's own freedom permanently creates a contradiction:

But by selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future use of it beyond single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of himself. . . .The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate his freedom. (FN68)

There is a difference between not allowing a person to give up his own freedom and not allowing the majority to accept a "potential" totalitarian regime. Forbidding an individual from selling himself does not contradict the principle of democracy, or the majority rule, but banning a party which is playing according to the rules of democracy contradicts with the core of the system.

In the past, the United States has not always been very tolerant of anti-democratic parties. For instance, during the McCarthy era where communist paranoia was epidemic, fifty members of the Communist Party were charged in accordance with the Smith Act of 1940. They were sentenced to prison for attempting to change the state and government through force (FN69). In 1969, twenty-eight years after the Dennis decision, when the anti-communist hysteria subsided, the Supreme Court started to apply a stricter standard. The state was required not only to prove that the speaker tried to entice people, it had to show that the speech would cause a serious and immediate danger (FN70).

The Algeria example demonstrates the danger of "temporarily" suspending the democratic process to protect democracy. The cancellation of the election in Algeria caused a civil war resulting in thousands of deaths (FN71).

Would Turkey be better if the military did not intervene? There should not be an absolute abstinence from banning political parties. Political activities that pose great and immediate danger for the survival of democracy might be controlled by the judiciary. Nevertheless, this solution should be the last resort. The justification by the judiciary of a bayonet/stock democracy for banning political parties in the name of democracy is not credible, especially if banning political parties has become a judicial habit. Numerous political parties have been banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court since a multiparty system was adopted in 1946, twenty-three years after the foundation of the Republic (FN72). The Library of National Congress of Turkey recently published a list of all political parties and their fate since the beginning of the Turkish Republic. The list is a graveyard of political parties. Many were banned or forced to dissolve by the Turkish Constitutional Court or by the so-called legislators who were controlled by military juntas. The political parties that were either banned or forced to resolve are listed below under their Turkish names in order of their chronological foundation:

(CC stands for Constitutional Court)

Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 1923, BANNED in 1981 by Law Nu: 2533.
Demokrat Parti, 1946, BANNED in 1960 by Martial Court.
Millet Partisi, 1948, BANNED in 1953 by Court.
Ufak Parti, 1957, BANNED in 1957 by Court.
Adalet Partisi, 1961, BANNED in 1981 by the Law Nu: 2533.
Turkiye Isci Partisi, 1961, BANNED in 1971 by the CC.
Turkiye Isci Ciftci Partisi, 1961, BANNED in 1968 by the CC.
Turkiye Ileri Ulku Partisi, 1969, BANNED in 1971 by the CC.
Milliyetci Hareket Partisi, 1969, BANNED in 1993 by the Law Nu: 2533.
Milli Nizam Partisi, 1970, BANNED in 1971 by the CC.
Milli Selamet Partisi, 1972, BANNED in 1981 by the Law Nu: 2533.
Turkiye Sosyalist Isci Partisi, 1974, BANNED in 1981 by the Law Nu: 2533.
Turkiye Isci Koylu Partisi, 1978, BANNED in 1981 by the Law Nu: 2533.
Sosyalist Devrim Partisi, ?, BANNED in 1981 by the Law Nu: 2533.
Buyuk Turkiye Partisi, 1983, BANNED in 1983 by the National Security Council
Yuce Gorev Partisi, 1983, BANNED in 1983 by the CC.
Refah Partisi, 1983, BANNED in 1998 by the CC.
Turkiye Huzur Partisi, 1983, BANNED in 1983 by the CC.
Fazilet Partisi, 1983, BANNED in 1984 by the CC.
Sosyalist Parti, 1988, BANNED in 1992 by the CC.
Yesiller Partisi, 1988, BANNED in 1994 by the CC.
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 1989, BANNED in 1991 by the CC.
Halk Partisi, 1989, BANNED in 1991 by the CC.
Turkiye Birlesik Komunist Partisi, 1990, BANNED in 1991 by the CC.
Halkin Emek Partisi, 1990, BANNED in 1993 by the CC.
Sosyalist Birlik Partisi, 1991, BANNED in 1995 by the CC.
Sosyalist Turkiye Partisi, 1992, BANNED in 1993 by the CC.
Demokrat Partisi, 1993, BANNED in 1994 by the CC.
Demokrasi ve Degisim Partisi, 1995, BANNED in 1996 by the CC.
Demokrat Parti, 1992, BANNED in 1994 by the CC.
Sosyalist Turkiye Partisi, 1992, BANNED in 1993 by the CC.
Demokratik Baris Partis, 1996, DISSOLVED after a law suit filed at CC.
Ozgurluk ve Demokrasi Partisi, 1992, BANNED in 1993 by the CC.
Dirilis Partisi, 1996, BANNED in 1996 by the CC.
Emegin Partisi, 1996, DISSOLVED after the suit was filed at CC.
Emek Partisi, 1996, DISSOLVED after the suit was filed at CC. (FN73)

Journalist Robin Wright, the author of the book Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam, evaluates the Turkish version of democracy in a different light:

The real danger in Turkey today, however, is not Refah [Party]. Rather, it is that either the military or the constitutional court will act on the pretext of preserving Turkey as a secular state. Because the price will be democracy. And in the end, Turkey will be no safer or more stable. Probably opposite.

Indeed, just how much of a "threat" Refah really represents for Turkey is seriously debatable. By standards in the United States, a land of personal freedoms and parochial schools, the majority of items on Refah's agenda are petty or non-issues: allowing girls to wear head scarves to school if they prefer; permitting children to go to religious schools through middle school; allowing those with Islamists beliefs to remain or rise in the military. (FN74)

Returning to the argument based on Hitler's rise to power through a democratic process, there is no evidence that Hitler would not have risen to power even if his party had been banned by the court (FN75). Taking into consideration the extraordinary conditions of the time and region, one can assert that the rise of fascism was inevitable with or without democracy or Hitler. Condemning democracy to eternal paranoia and submitting the democratic process to the supervision and control of non-elected powers cannot be justified by speculating about a historical mishap, such as the example of Nazi Germany. Democracies can easily be turned on their sides when banning parties in the name of democracy is justified. The Turkish and Algerian examples are two recent examples of this slippery slope. They show that the real and most common suicide of democracies is not due to their tolerance but due to their deterioration to authoritarian and militarist regimes by groups who purport to save it from the harm of "evil" political parties.

VI. FACTORS TURNING TURKISH DEMOCRACY INTO AN OLIGARCHY

Ersin Kalaycioglu, a professor of Social Sciences at the Bogazici University argues that the Turkish democracy has complex problems and lists several reasons for these problems (FN76). Professor Kalaycioglu's argument can be summarized in five main points:

(1) Transition to democracy did not immediately follow the fall of the authoritarian and totalitarian Ottoman regime. There were many Turks who admired and longed for the authoritarian past. The transition to democracy did not happen with the consensus of the political powers over the constitution and democratic rules and procedures.

(2) The Turkish political elite could not reach a compromise on a fair electoral system that woukd erase doubts regarding election results.

(3) Military interventions prevented the institutionalization of a party system in Turkey. Rapid urbanization and industrialization, combined with the banning of political parties and the division of the voting electorate caused a democratic crisis.

(4) Turkish interest groups are weak and ignored by statist politicians. The elite class of the State still looks suspiciously at civil organizations run by volunteers whose members make up only six percent of the entire voting population.

(5) The Turkish Grand National Assembly, and especially those who occupy ministerial seats and participate in clientelism, tends to please the short-term demands of their constituents through corruptive means.

While Kalaycioglu's assessment is a valid starting point, there are other crucial factors that contribute to the malformation and degeneration of Turkish democracy. These factors include:

(1) Turkey's population boom. Rapid increases in population bring many serious problems. Turkey, having doubled its population in thirty-two years (FN77), will need resources to improve schools and universities, factories, hospitals, housing facilities, bridges and highways. If politicians continue to ignore the rapid growth of the population and do not mobilize families to use birth control, the population problem will continue to worsen, and will eventually shake the social, political and economic structure of Turkey.

(2) Several of Turkey's official policies are racially motivated (FN78). In the early days of the Turkish Republic, the founding father Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, sought to replace the Arabized Ottoman identity with a new national identity. He promoted the Turkish nationalism that is expressed in his most famous slogan "ne mutlu Turkum diyene" (Happy is he who can call himself a Turk). In those days, Turkish nationalism could be justified as a unifying symbol and a substitute of Ottoman identity against eastern and western cultural imperialism. The slogan, "Happy is he who can call himself a Turk" became the most repeated and visible official slogan. It was inscribed on government buildings, classrooms, monuments, highways, mountains, and textbooks. This slogan, however, soon became the motto of racists who attempted to deny the Kurds of their identity and prevent them from assimilating their culture into Turkey. While there are still those who claim that the word "Turk" defines a nation and not a race (FN79), the problem caused by using the name of an ethnic majority as the name of a nation has caused racial division and civil war in modern Turkey (FN80).

Turkey is paying a hefty price for its racial discriminations. Forcing elementary and middle school children who speak Kurdish at home to chant and declare "Happy is he who can call himself a Turk" and "I am a Turk, I am honest, I am hard-working" every morning has caused both psychological and sociological reactions among the Kurds. Economic deprivation and the military's inhuman treatment and humiliation of Kurds for decades continue to ignite and fuel the current civil war in southeast Turkey (FN81).

(3) Turkey suffers from a corrupt bureaucracy and a state policy that causes an unjust income distribution. This issue will be discussed briefly in the next section.

(4) Turkey's political system makes it impossible to check and control the governments. Indeed, the military is the only exceptional power in Turkey. Also, the government has excessive powers which ultimately lead to corruption and abuse. Perhaps a presidential system like that the United States or France would prove to be a better alternative for Turkey (FN82).

(5) Local governments in Turkey are not empowered to be more independent from the central government. Turkey would benefit enormously from a federal system. The Federal System should be considered, without listening to those who want to manufacture "uniform" citizens (FN83). The federal systems successfully practiced in the US and Switzerland may provide valuable examples.

(6) The dogmas which are inherited from the Umayyad, the Abbasyd and the Ottomans era are promoted by powerful clergymen, and have turned a significant segment of the population into anti-democratic zealots (FN84). Unless intellectuals seriously question the traditional religion and start a reformation movement, sects and orders will continue to mold medieval minds (FN85).

(7) Women do not participate in the social and political life of Turkey: Women, who constitute half of the population, are left far behind men because of prevalent male chauvinistic attitudes in Turkey (FN86). Even having a female prime minister, is not enough to change the long-held social attitudes (FN87).

(8) Gross Human Rights violations are ongoing in Turkey. Turkey, with its criminal procedures, police and prisons has been violating the human rights of its citizens. To protect citizens against the aggression of law enforcement officials, Turkish criminal procedure should be reformed.

Anthropology professor Paul J. Magnarella, a consultant for the Third World Research Association, finds the human rights situation in Turkey appalling (FN88). He lists four factors contributing to this situation: statism and authoritarianism; military involvement in government, the economy and society; Ataturk's principle of populism; and legalism. Below is a lengthy excerpt from his analysis which is an impressively accurate diagnosis of the political, economic and social problems in Turkey. Any opposition that threatens the power of the ruling elite, be it religious, ethnic, or socialist, has always been crushed by the Kemalist oligarchy.

1) Statism and authoritarianism. The state, through the government in power, closely directs the country's economy, society and culture. "In Kemalist Turkey, reform and centralization by a cohesive center was the ideal aim of stagecraft, as it had been in Ottoman Turkey. In the multiparty period [from 1946] this tradition persisted in the form of 'bureaucratic paternalism' and military imposition of reform." The Turkish political scientist, Metin Tamkoc, has written: "Modernization of Turkey was initiated under the authoritarian regime of Ataturk. His authoritarian political system was the product of the traditional political culture and patrimonial infrastructure. . . . [In] Turkey there is no room for an 'opposition group.' The governing elite do not tolerate opposition to their authority or their policies." The ruling elites have also shown little tolerance for criticism. For example, in her statement to the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Lois Whitman, Deputy Director of Helsinki Watch, said police had harassed, detained, interrogated, and beaten scores of journalists for their writings. Some have been tried and sentenced, having been convicted under the very broad anti-terror law of such offenses as criticizing or insulting the president, public officials, Ataturk, or the military, or of printing anti-military propaganda.

2) Military involvement in government, the economy and society. The military elite, seeing themselves as the guardians of the state and Ataturk's heritage, intervene frequently in the economy and government, either through authoritarian advice or coups. The noted Turkish political journalist, Mehmet Ali Birand, has written that the Turkish armed forces are perceived to have the legitimate right and duty to intervene in politics and government in the name of the nation. He adds that through coups and military rule, the generals "have stamped their imprint on every aspect of Turkish society for the foreseeable future."

3) Ataturk's principle of populism. Populism stands against class-based politics and for an indivisible, unified state based on one people and one language. A component of populism is Turkification; the state, through ruling governments from Ataturk to the present, has tried to convert ethnically heterogeneous peoples into a homogeneous population of Turks. The process has involved rewriting history (e.g., the sun-language theory, which maintains that Turkish is the origin of all other languages) and suppressing the cultural identity and expression of non-Turkish peoples within Turkey.

4) Legalism. The practice by both civilian and military governments to legalize all the above, so as to legitimize the state's often intimate involvement in the economy, society and culture; the political and legal consequences of military intervention; and the related processes of Turkification and suppression of non-Turkish culture. (FN89)

VII. OLIGARCHY AND ECONOMIC CORRUPTION

The Attorney General of the Turkish Republic complained about the extremely low educational level of the majority of the Turkish population (FN90). Considering that Kemalism rules every aspect of life in Turkey, from education to the media, from the banks to the armed forces, this is a surprising admission by a respected officer of the Turkish ruling class. Nevertheless, the Attorney General's remarks appear to be more of a criticism of the population rather than of the system which governs the population.

The Attorney General, in his charge, attempted to explain the rise of the Refah Party: "Erbakan and his friends have found many supporters because the majority of the population has low level of education and the idea of democracy has not matured in the minds of our intellectuals." (FN91) The implication of this complaint exposes the mindset of the Turkish oligarchy: democracy is a luxury for our people since they are not educated and intelligent enough to vote for the best party. I disagree. Even if we consider the majority of Turkish population as "uneducated," they are still "self-interested, rational utility maximizers." (FN92) People have been disappointed for decades by the practice of politicians who preach about Ataturk, secularism, democracy, western standards, science and the level of modern civilization. Turkey's limited budget has been generously spent on an unnecessarily large military (FN93). Prominent businessmen are favored through corrupt state auctions and protective tariffs that have turned Turkey into a gold mine, ready to be pillaged. The gap between the majority and the richest segment of the population has grown wider because of corruption in the political system. Cetin Altan, a well-known Turkish journalist (FN94), frequently brings up this disturbing idea of economic corruption:

Thanks, the annual inflation finally reached to 90%. God willing, it will reach to 100% by the next year, of course, due to the indivisible unity of our country... The fortunate top 20% of population is devouring the 54% of the national income. The condemned bottom 20% of the population, on the other hand, is left with only 4% of the national income. . . .These are the data of a kettle steaming with "domestic troubles. . . .The kettle has already started bubbling. Can water be prevented from being boiled at 100¡ Celsius by formulas of shooting and getting shot in the cause of the State? (FN95)

Ziya Onis, a professor of economy at the Bogazici University, warns about the dangerous gap between the rich and poor:

Compared with its respectable growth performance, Turkey has a poor income distribution record. With a gini coefficient of slightly over 0.5 for the past three decades, the Turkish record compares favorably only with the worst cases of income inequality in the developing world: Brazil and Mexico. Its distributional record is considerably inferior to the hyper-growth cases of Taiwan and South Korea, both of which have substantially lower gini coefficients. (FN96)

The author blames unfair taxation as the cause of this dangerous income gap. While public and private sector employees earn only 20% of national income, they contribute to 80% of tax revenue (FN97).

The Turkish oligarchy, or a small group of influential families, benefit from government auctions, slanted tax laws and the official economic policy. Unfortunately, the members of the Turkish Armed Forces have been attracted to this insensate pillage and plunder.

The Military Mutual Assistance Association (OYAK) that was formed in the 1960's has invested heavily in industries such as automobiles, trucks, tires, petrochemicals, cement, food production, retail sales and service. This economic interest creates enormous incentives for military personnel, either retired or on-duty, to follow the domestic economy and politics a little too closely.

The Turkish military, through OYAK, became partners with foreign and domestic firms and shared with them the same concerns for profits, political stability, and labor compliance. Consequently, the military's corporate interests expanded into the areas of labor law, trade unionism, monetary policy, corporate taxation, investment banking, the media, and other related matters. (FN98)

The descendants of pashas and feudal landlords who exploited the name of Turkey's national hero Mustafa Kemal Ataturk for their petty interests have pushed Turkey into chaos. They have pushed Turkey far away from being a democratic state, and its people will not forever stand idly by. The majority of people might be ignorant but they are by no means stupid. Fed up with the corruption and mismanagement, the people searched for hope in the Welfare Party (FN99). The Attorney General, instead of accusing the Welfare Party and insulting the intelligence of the people, should have questioned the ruling class.

There is no need to guess what topics are discussed by the Turkish National Security Committee. Who can question the glorious generals who are the defenders of the country, defenders of what they claim to be a democracy? Any political changes that challenge their interests are automatically labeled a danger for the country and regime. That danger is then exposed through the highly controlled media (FN100).

Journalist William Pfaff made a correlation between the endemic economic corruption of governments and the rise of the Refah Party:

The political society of Turkey has been extremely but imperfectly Westernized. The modern party system has shallow roots and tends to produce governments closely, and sometimes corruptly, linked to the major commercial and banking groups of the nation, cut off from the peasantry of what remains a poor if rapidly and erratically developing country. . . . The Islamist party, the Refah or Welfare Party, is paradoxically the only modern political organization in Turkey. It has deep roots in countryside and village, offering a program of religio-political reform to a population disoriented by the forces of modernization. (FN101)

Pfaff's assessment is precisely accurate. Many Turkish authors acknowledged the economic component as the cause of the Welfare Party's unexpected popularity. For instance, Ali Riza Karduz, a Turkish columnist, wrote: "Refah Party, did not accomplish just by exploiting religious beliefs for their political ends, but it also managed to establish a dialogue with people, especially the poor." (FN102) Ironically, there is no hope looming on the horizon that the oligarchy, whose responsibility is to solve the economic disparity in the country, has any intent of doing so.

VIII. THEOCRATIC SECULARISM